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This paper provides a review of the literature on the fencing of the communal-
tenure rangelands in northern Namibia and summarises the current state of play 
at both field and policy levels.  Implications of the enclosure of these lands are 
discussed, both for the different stakeholders in the process as well as for the 
agricultural sector as a whole.  The paper concludes with some suggestions as to 
the likely evolution of the fencing issue in the near future, makes a plea for 
additional research to be undertaken as a matter of priority in a number of areas 
in order to inform the policy-making process, and proposes a number of 
interventions which should immediately b e  m a d e  i n  o r d e r  t o  a s s i s t  f a r m e r s  
adversely affected by the fencing movement.  
 
1.1 The  phenomenon 
 
Over the last twenty years, large portions of rangeland have been excised from 
the communal-tenure areas in many places in the north of Namibia, particularly 
that area lying to the north-east of the Etosha National Park, in Oshikoto region 
which is located in the north-central part of the country (see Figure 1). The 
process, which has involved the enclosure of communal-tenure grazing land to 
form de facto private farms, has been a rapid one, such that extensive tracts of 
land in eastern Oshikoto region are now being operated and managed as private 
farms.  For the most part, the communal pastures in question were previously 
sparsely settled and/or only used on a temporary basis for grazing in the dry 
season by livestock belonging to herders living to the west.  For a number of 
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reasons, the land allocation process which traditionally operated within 
communities on the basis of customary law has been undermined by a process of 
allocating areas of rangeland land to individuals, usually in return for payment 
to the traditional authorities.  These areas have subsequently been fenced-off 
from the communal grazing land. 
 
Some of these farms are extremely large, even by private-tenure farm standards.  
For example, a fence running along one side of an enclosed farm in the Okongo 
area was measured as being more than 20 kilometres long (Fuller & Turner, 1994: 
22). 
 
1.2 The  methodology  used in drafting the paper 
 
Given the office-bound nature of the work of the author, original field research 
into the issue of fencing was not possible.  Nevertheless, as a part of his work 
activities he has attended a number of meetings at which the fencing issue has 
been raised and the interest which he showed in the subject meant that he was 
asked to review some of the reports drafted by the researchers involved in the 
detailed study of fencing in eastern Oshikoto, carried out under the auspices of 
the Overseas Development Institute, ODI, and the Namibian Economic Policy 
Research Unit, NEPRU (Cox et al., 1998).  For these reasons, the approach 
followed by this paper is largely one of a review of the literature – both 
published and grey – supplemented, wherever possible, with ideas and 
information obtained from discussions with those who have carried out work in 
the field. 
 
Given the comprehensive nature of the ODI/NEPRU study and the fact that it 
was carried out only recently, the report of the study provided the principal 
source document for this paper.  
 
1.3  The geographical focus of the paper 
 
While the enclosure movement has been taking place over much of the 
communal-tenure land in the country, the focus of this paper is on the fencing 
taking place in the north-central part of Namibia and, in particular, in Oshikoto 
region – one of the four regions which cover the area formerly known as 
‘Ovamboland’ (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1:  Main regions in the Northern Communal Areas where fencing is 
taking place 
 
1.4  Why study this topic? 
 
The area under review contains a high proportion of the country’s poor and 
destitute. For this reason, any changes (de facto or de jure) in its land tenure status 
can have a significant impact on poverty.  The enclosure of vast areas of 
rangeland means that the poor no longer have rights to the resources (mainly 
pasture and water) thus enclosed and this directly reduces the livelihood options 
of those amongst the poor who have livestock. 
 
1.5  The position of livestock in rural households’ livelihood systems and 
the economy at large 
 
Throughout most of the communal-tenure farming areas, livestock are the 
backbone of the farming systems, with crop production being important but 
making only a marginal contribution to farm incomes.  In the study area, for 




example, arable farming provides less than 10 per cent of farm incomes (National 
Planning Commission, 1994:1611.  Livestock are kept because they have multiple 
uses – meat, milk, manure and hides – as well as increasing the efficiency of 
arable farming through the draught power which they provide.  They are, in 
addition, a means by which savings can be accumulated and earn interest.  
 
However, not all households hold livestock, and surveys of livestock holdings 
amongst rural households in former Ovambo region show that ownership is 
highly skewed.  More than a quarter of all cattle are kept in herds of more than 
100 head and owned by only 5 per cent of the households, while almost 40 per 
cent of farm households own no cattle at all2.  Thus, 90 per cent of the cattle in 
the region are held by only 37 per cent of households (Grimm, 1994:19).  It also 
appears that there is an increasing disparity in ownership, with wealthier 
individuals maintaining or increasing their herd sizes while an increasing 
number of households own no livestock at all (FAO, 1992: Annex 1:7).  
 
Moreover, there are indications that the impact of drought serves to aggravate 
the unequal distribution of livestock holdings, with small herds being wiped out 
– through death or emergency sales.  The owners of larger herds usually have the 
resources (both on- and off-farm) to tide themselves and their herds over until 
the next rainy season.  For this reason, any process which is making households 
with small livestock holdings more vulnerable to drought – and it has been 
argued that this is one impact of the fencing-off of communal-tenure rangeland 
for private farms – serves to increase inequalities3. This fact, alone, underlines the 
importance of investigating further the fencing phenomenon.  
 
At the same time, the livestock sub-sector is of considerable importance to the 
national economy – livestock and meat provide approximately 90 per cent of 
agricultural exports which, in turn, make up more than 15 per cent of the 
country’s visible export earnings.  Furthermore, livestock husbandry contributes 
98 per cent of national agricultural income.  For these reasons, any changes 
which are likely to affect the productivity and rate of offtake of the herds in the 
northern communal-tenure areas are likely to have a significant impact on the 
economy as a whole.  
 
2. THE  PROCESS   
 
2.1 Description   




The first reports of communal-tenure rangeland being fenced-off in southern 
Oshikoto region, occurred in the late-1970s when local businessmen began to 
seek and obtain approval from local chiefs for large areas of land to be allocated 
to them for grazing4.  Once it had been thus allocated, the new ‘owners’ argued 
that by fencing the land they were merely demarcating its boundaries. 
 
If someone in the communal-tenure areas wishes to construct a house, they first 
apply for land and an adjacent area on which to plant crops to the village 
headmen who have customary control over land matters.  On the other hand, 
however, for rangeland which lies outside the village area, the request is made to 
the senior headman or traditional leader of the area or, in some instances, to the 
King.  
 
Because the decision to allocate rangeland is made by the tribal authorities who 
in most cases are located outside the area in question (and therefore, it can be 
assumed, have little detailed knowledge of it), the first that the communal-tenure 
farmers whose livestock have previously grazed the land know about permission 
having been sought (and granted) for the area to be excised, is when the fencing 
is put up. 
 
During a survey of fencing carried out in central Oshikoto region in 1994, a 
number of chiefs confirmed that it was common for a far larger area of land to be 
enclosed by individuals than had been envisaged by the authorities when they 
had approved the  application to fence.  In addition, reports have appeared of 
some land areas being appropriated without any authorisation at all having first 
been granted by the traditional leaders.   
 
However, it is not only grazing land which has been enclosed - water sources are 
also fenced off since adequate water supplies are essential for any livestock 
enterprise5.  These sources include natural ponds formed during the rains and in 
which water remains for some time after the end of the rains.  In addition, hand-
dug wells are scattered throughout the rangeland areas.  Finally, there was a 
rapid increase in borehole construction as part of the government’s 1992/93 
drought relief measures in the eastern part of Oshikoto region.   
 
All three of these types of water sources have been enclosed and thus 
incorporated into ‘private’ holdings: for example, most of the boreholes installed 
by the government in the Onamisu area which is located near the eastern 




borehole not fenced is, effectively, controlled by a farmer whose fence runs 
adjacent to the borehole.  In the case of this area, it is understood that 
government employees heard that boreholes were to be drilled in the area and 
immediately set about fencing land adjacent to their future sites (Cox et al., 1998: 
74).  Other examples are given by researchers from the field, of “defensive” 
fencing taking place around boreholes provided by the government: residents in 
the surrounding area who make use of the water from that borehole are forced to 
fence the structure in an attempt to prevent the degradation of the rangeland 
surrounding it which would threaten their own herds.  They may also fence the 
structure before it and the surrounding pasture are annexed by a wealthy, well-
connected ‘encloser’ from outside the area.  Indeed, there are even reports of 
these communities starting to charge non-local herders wishing to use water 
from this source. 
 
Recent field research in eastern Oshikoto region has shown that two-thirds of the 
boreholes in a study area, most of which were provided by the Government 
(others are traditional wells) for use by local communities, now lie within or 
along the boundaries of fenced land.  Most of the remainder are in the process of 
being fenced-off.  This amounts to the de facto privatisation of water supply – 
water being the principal scarce resource in the area and a key input to livestock 
farming.  Not all water requirements for these new private farms are met in this 
way – Silfverberg (1995:41) notes that a significant amount of water 
infrastructure investment is undertaken by the ‘enclosers’ themselves subsequent 
to the fencing of the grazing areas (see Section 3, below). 
 
2.2 History   
 
The enclosure of land began shortly after the demarcation and fencing of the 
“Mangetti Block” which lies along and immediately to the north of the 
Veterinary Cordon Fence, stretching from near Oshivelo eastwards, as far as the 
main road to Rundu in Kavango region.  Indeed, some researchers maintain that 
the fencing movement was triggered by the creation of this “FNDC6 mega-
ranch” (Green, 1990: 5) which comprises, among other things, a large quarantine 
farm and 150 individual holdings used for livestock rearing.  Fuller et al (1996: 9) 
report that farmers felt threatened by the action of the South African authorities 
in enclosing the Mangetti Block.  They therefore decided that ‘defensive fencing’ 
was necessary in order to prevent any possible expansion northwards of the 




traditionally made use of.  In this way, they would be able to preserve their 
access to the resources before others did the same. 
 
Given the absence of any land policy and the lack of any constitutional 
recognition of customary land rights in communal-tenure areas, ‘illegal’ fencing 
grew rapidly in the 1980’s and accelerated around the time of Independence in 
19907 (and has reportedly increased since then).  Thus, by the early-1990’s the 
enclosure of land was being regularly mentioned in the literature: “…. There has 
been an unverified amount of unscheduled fencing and water development 
north of Mangetti.  These official and unofficial ranches are largely held by 
businessmen and politicians who are seldom resident and who derive secondary 
rather than primary income from them”.  Again, in 1993, the report of a field 
survey carried out in the former Ovambo region, noted that, “some illegal cattle 
enclosures were observed near the cattle post” (MASDAR Zambia Ltd., 1993:15).  
Indeed, by this date, the phenomenon of fencing had become so widespread that 
the same report describes farmers as belonging to one of four categories, namely: 
“village”, “absentee”, “legally-enclosed”8 or “illegally enclosed” (ibid:19) 
 
In 1994, an aerial survey of fencing in Oshikoto region for the first time provided 
hard evidence that extensive land enclosure that had taken place. It was also able 
to show that the fenced area was continuing to expand rapidly.  At this time, too, 
many reports on the phenomenon and the impact it was having on herders’ 
ability to graze their cattle on the remaining communal-tenure rangeland, began 
appearing in the local print media (see Section 5, below).  
 
The Ndonga Tribal Authority encouraged and authorised local people to 
undertake ‘defensive fencing’ in accordance with a specific approval procedure.  
Copies of the approved ‘agreements’ were kept.  Thus, by the end of 1996, the 
Authority had registered records of more than 100 fenced properties.  This did 
not, however, prevent the alienation of some areas without the approval of the 
Authority and its gradual loss of control over the process of land allocation has 
continued since Independence - evidenced by a significant drop in the number of 
registrations since 1990 (Cox et al., 1998: 39).  
 
The situation today is, to all intents and purposes, that the new elite is able to 
enclose communal-tenure rangeland for private use without obtaining 
authorisation from anyone.  This land-grab9 is encouraged by various factors 




obtained from market-oriented livestock husbandry and that fences are needed if 
such a system is to be operated efficiently (Seely et al., 1994:16).   
 
Evidence that enclosure is continuing apace is provided by Cox et al (1998:52) 
who, during their field work, found markers and posts placed on the ground in 
several places along what were clearly future fence lines.  The increasingly-fast 
pace of land enclosure in the recent past may, perhaps, be caused in part at least, 
by potential enclosers anticipating that legalisation of de facto private ownership 
of land through enclosure is likely in the near future.  The reasoning of these 
farmers is that since the status quo is likely to prevail with any new law, they 
should obtain such an asset while its cost remains minimal – once the legislation 
is enacted they will simply obtain formal title to the land which they hold.   
Pressure may also be coming from the traditional authorities, themselves, who 
perceive that the income they are earning from allocating land for enclosure will 
dry up once the Communal Land Bill has been enacted, “hence the allocation of 
grazing land is rapid so as to reap the benefit of payment while is it still possible” 
(Blackie & Tarr, 1998: 3).  
 
3.  THE CURRENT EXTENT OF THE ENCLOSURES AND THOSE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR IT 
 
3.1 Spatial  distribution   
 
Researchers and other observers report that fencing is a widespread 
phenomenon throughout the communal-tenure areas, although most reports and 
research have focussed on its evolution in Ohangwena and Oshikoto regions, as 
well as Omaheke in the east to the south of the VCF (Quan et al., 1994:90). Indeed, 
the only communal-tenure area administrative regions having a high population 
density which have not been fenced to any great extent are Kavango and Caprivi 
(Blackie, 1998:7).  For example, reports indicate that the enclosure of land has 
now spread to areas where it had previously been unheard of.  The Namibian 
(1994: 4) reported that “rampant illegal fencing…. right through traditional 
communal areas” in Kaokoland9 was being carried out by entrepreneurs from 
“far off places”.  It is also widespread in the eastern communal-tenure areas 
which lie to the south of the Veterinary Cordon Fence10. 
 
As noted earlier, the enclosure movement spread rapidly in the area to the north 
of the Mangetti Block and has expanded outwards from there ever since.  It was 




country shortly before Independence and the return of a significant proportion of 
the population from Angola, some of whom immediately sought to obtain large 
land holdings.  More recently - the past three to five years – eastern Oshikoto 
region has witnessed a rapid increase in the fencing of large pieces of land, such 
that one study estimates only one-quarter of the region now remains un-
enclosed12 (Blackie & Tarr, 1998:3).   
 
3.2 The  ‘enclosers’ 
 
Tapscott (1994[a]) described those undertaking the fencing as being part of an 
“unholy alliance – the political elite, the traditional elite and business people”. 
Indeed, this has been confirmed by other field researchers who have interviewed 
‘enclosers’ and categorised them as representing powerful political and economic 
interest groups and having good contacts with customary authorities; they 
include business people, urban-based wage earners13, traders, teachers, nurses, 
clergy, civil servants, politicians and other top government officials, and others 
with access to off-farm income (Cox et al., 1998: 40).  They also include a few full-
time farmers who own large livestock herds (Quan et al., 1992:92).   
 
Clearly, then, they are largely town-based, with few of them resident on or near 
their farms, while only some of them are from the local area.  Not surprisingly, 
given the length of fencing which is required to enclose even a small area of land, 
it is these people – the wealthier ones – who are the only ones able to meet the 
considerable expenditure involved14.  Indeed, the high cost of such fencing also 
explains why many of the areas being privatised in eastern Oshikoto region are 
not completely enclosed, since the encloser probably has insufficient funds to 
complete the work in one go (Cox et al., 1998: 51).  For the individual ‘encloser’ 
his15 primary concern has been to establish visible ownership of the allocated 
area, driven by the fact that “possession is nine-tenths of the law” and should 
any legislation on fencing be enacted, de facto private occupation would be 
formalised.  Receiving no clear signals to the contrary, potential ‘enclosers’ have 
thus been encouraged to apply for land (Tapscott, 1990:20). 
 
Members of the wealthy elite are also able to afford the payment required by the 
traditional authorities for the land to be allocated to them, a not inconsiderable 
sum in certain instances16.  In addition, the provision of water infrastructure can 
be an expensive investment – costing anything between N$ 37,000 and N$ 
196,000 per unit (Blackie, 1998: 317.   




Thus, less well-off individuals are excluded from the fencing option and from the 
resources the fences enclose.  
 
4. GOVERNMENT  POLICY ON LAND ENCLOSURE 
 
4.1 Legal  status 
 
Despite the fundamental consequences of enclosures, those acquiring exclusive 
access to land by fencing are not, strictly speaking, breaking any laws, since 
unrepealed legislation means that traditional authorities retained de facto control 
over land matters (Cox et al., 1998:13) and have continued to allocate land at their 
discretion.  It has been argued that in the absence of any legislation, such action 
is not illegal.   
 
4.2  Statements made by leaders and other opinion formers  
 
One of the resolutions of the National Conference on Land Reform and the Land 
Question, held in July 1991, was that the communal-tenure areas should be 
retained and developed – various resolutions to this effect were passed, 
including a plea that the practice of paying for land, particularly in the north, be 
stopped, that fencing be prohibited and that all “illegal” fences be removed 
(Werner, 1997:4).   
 
At this time, shortly after Independence, fencing was a relatively rare 
phenomenon.  However, as the process ‘took off’ in the years shortly after 
Independence (see above), reports on fencing, and on the reaction to it of 
government officials and politicians, began appearing in the press.  For example, 
The Namibian carried a report as early as November 1993 that the Cabinet had 
expressed its view that action should be taken to stop illegal fencing in the 
communal-tenure areas (26/11/93).  Shortly thereafter, the then Minister of Lands, 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation, stated that “illegal fencing of communal land 
cannot be tolerated and fencing-in grazing areas in a way which bars the rest of 
the community is against Cabinet and the Constitution”.  However, he stated 
that many of the large farms in the communal-tenure areas were legal “because a 
local chief or headman gave permission for the fences”.  Rather surprisingly, 
perhaps, he emphasised that there had been “no complaints at all of headmen 
handing out land to the detriment of the community” (The Namibian,; 09/06/94). 




illegally fenced off areas and action would follow the new act” (The Namibian, op 
cit.).  There is no evidence that such investigations were, in fact, ever carried out.  
 
More recently, President Nujoma declared a moratorium on fencing of all land in 
excess of 10ha, effective from March 1997.  However, not surprisingly in the 
absence of any census of the existing fenced areas, the moratorium apparently 
had little impact and the process has continued unabated.  Furthermore, it would 
appear that the President was referring to “illegal” fencing – in other words, that 
fencing which had taken place without the consent of traditional authorities.  For 
the bulk of the area already fenced any moratorium would not have had any 
relevance since it was authorised by the traditional authorities (Cox et al., 
1998:15). 
 
4.2 Land  policy 
 
The absence of any constitutional recognition of customary land tenure rights in 
communal-tenure areas and of a comprehensive land policy until very recently, 
resulted in communal-tenure farmers and traditional authorities having no 
recourse to statutory law to defend their rights (Cox et al., 1998: 39).  Powerful 
interest groups sometimes used this policy and administrative vacuum18 to their 
advantage and ignored customary land tenure rights to obtain fenced farms. 
 
It was not until late-1997 that the White Paper on the National Land Policy 
(MLR&R, 1997) was published.  It addressed the fencing issue by declaring (p. 
25) “an immediate end to any new fencing (for private enclosure of non-
residential or crop land)”.  An earlier draft had included the phrase, “any fencing 
erected after the date of adoption of the Land Policy will be removed without 
compensation irrespective of whether or not it had been with the approval of the 
traditional authority”.  This did not appear in the final version of the Policy 
document. The document was discussed and approved by the National 
Assembly in early-1998; the Communal Land Bill has still (the end of the third 
quarter of 1998) not been debated by Parliament, although the latest information 
is that it has been forwarded to the Council of Traditional Leaders for comment, 
which is explicitly provided for in the Constitution – and will subsequently be 
debated in Parliament. 
 
The Policy bravely states that before the fencing of land is approved, “it must be 
demonstrated that enough land remains available for other local users at present 




has already had on the bulk of the rural population excluded from the enclosures 
(see Section 5, below), this could prove virtually impossible to demonstrate.  
 
It has also been argued that the fencing movement has served to impede the 
broader land reform process, since the ‘enclosers’ are those who in the absence of 
the option to enclose, would have been most likely to press for immediate land 
reform.  However, they have been able to obtain land relatively easily.  It is also 
felt that the relatively slow uptake of loans under Agribank’s Affirmative Action 
Loans Scheme can be attributed, at least in part, to the enclosures - there being no 
incentive for potential large-scale farmers from the communal-tenure areas to 
purchase private-tenure farms south of the Veterinary Cordon Fence. 
 
4.3  The Communal Land Bill 
 
Under the Communal Land Bill which was recently published, the communal-
tenure areas will continue to be held in trust by the State for ‘traditional’ 
communities residing in them (MLR&R, 1998: Clause 17); the Bill does not 
explicitly recognise collective ownership nor secure group user rights to 
communal grazing land and water points, nor does it provide a mechanism for 
formalising communal tenure through applications mad e  b y  g r o u p s  t o  t h e  
Communal Land Boards19 which are to be established under the Act.   It would 
therefore appear that, once again, the opportunity for communities to take 
effective control of their resources has been lost.  
 
The Bill explicitly prohibits fencing of the rangeland areas once the Bill is 
enacted, while existing fences will be removed unless they have been authorised 
“in accordance with the provisions of this Act” (ibid:18).  The de facto owners of 
the enclosed properties will have to apply to the Land Boards within three years 
of the enactment of the Bill, for authorisation to retain the existing fences on the 
land.  This application will need to be accompanied by a supporting letter from 
the chief/traditional authority who gave consent for the fence(s) to be erected.    
 
A Board will, itself, have the power to resolve any conflicting claims in respect of 
the land in question, and may convene a hearing to help it to resolve the matter.  
The matter can also be referred back to the chief/traditional authority in order to 
seek their opinion on whether or not to allocate the fenced property to the 
applicant.  If a Board is satisfied that the fences were erected with the consent of 
the chief/traditional authority, and that the fences are performing a useful 




it deems appropriate.  A lease can then be granted to the applicant.  However, if 
there is evidence that the fenced boundaries are not in conformity with 
customary law, that they encroach on the communal grazing area or that any 
other person claims to have rights over the land area in question, then a hearing 
can be called and the claim may be refused. 
 
There are some aspects of the Bill which could have a critical influence on the 
fencing issue in the future.  They include: firstly, the maximum length of a lease 
is 10 years if the applicant is not a member of the “traditional community” in 
whose communal area the land is situated (ibid:34).  This may well be the case for 
many of the ‘enclosers’20  Moreover, it would be too short a period for them to 
invest in any meaningful way in the land they have fenced.  Secondly, it may be 
difficult for the Land Boards to establish that it is “reasonably necessary” to 
allow the applicant to retain the fences (ibid:29[8]).  Finally, it is of concern that 
the enormous resources – both financial and human – that will be required if the 
Bill is to be enacted vigorously and in an efficient manner, may not have been 
fully planned for by those who will be involved in its implementation.  It is 
important that such resources be budgeted for, in full, by the government. 
 
5.  THE IMPACT OF FENCING 
 
The strong likelihood that fencing would have a negative impact on the 
government’s efforts to develop livestock farming in the communal-tenure areas 
was recognised early on.  For example, the need for the government to take the 
steps necessary “to enforce the existing law of preventing individuals from 
fencing land in the communal areas…”, was a specific requirement laid down in 
the agreement drawn up between the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development - principal financier of the Northern Regions Livestock 
Development Project - and the government, in November 1994 (IFAD, 1994:18). 
 
5.1 On  the  production  and  productivity of the ‘privatised’ farms  
 
Researchers appear divided on the impact that fencing is having on the livestock 
enterprises of the ‘enclosers’ (although some of the ambiguity can perhaps be 
explained by the fact that improved management practices have been adopted 
only in the very recent past).   
 
On the one hand, there are those who argue that there is little difference between 




there is little evidence that management and offtake is generally higher than in 
the rest of the communal areas” (Food & Agriculture Organisation, 1992: Annex 
3:1121.  Similarly Pankhurst (1995:570) found little evidence that the different de 
facto land tenure status gave rise to any improvements in range or stock 
management.  For this reason, she argued, marketed output of livestock from the 
area had not increased. 
 
A common finding has also been that owners of fenced farms will leave their 
livestock to graze outside their holdings on the communal-tenure ranges during 
and immediately after the rainy season when the pasture is abundant.  After 
some time, when the pasture is no longer able to support the animals, the 
‘enclosers’ remove their stock to their own fenced holdings to graze the protected 
‘reserve’ areas.  It is probable that range management specialists could have been 
looking at just such a situation when they commented on the “extremely good” 
grass growth inside several fenced areas visited in former Ovambo region 
(MASDAR Zambia Ltd., 1993:15).   
 
Hardly surprisingly, therefore, the livestock of the ‘enclosers’ will be in a better 
position to cope with drought conditions than those husbanded on the 
communal-tenure pastures throughout the year.  Indeed, Tapscott (1994[a]) 
argued that this was the case during the 1992/93 drought – those who had 
fenced were less affected than those herding outside enclosures.  He, however, 
provided no evidence to support his argument.  
 
On the other hand Cox et al. (1998) and others argue that fencing is aimed at 
preserving fodder for dry season grazing, since the commencement of Meatco 
buying operations in the area in the early-1990’s resulted in farmers seeing that 
the animals they sold were being downgraded due to their low body-weights.  
One way to overcome this was to obtain control over one of the key production 
inputs – feed.   
 
Fencing also enables commercial producers to keep expensive, high-performance 
breeding stock from mating with other herders’ cows and is a simple way of 
keeping the cattle which have been vaccinated against various diseases apart 
from other cattle, thus avoiding reinfection. 
 
Other observers have remarked that internal fences have been erected on some of 
the enclosed farms to enable rotational grazing to be undertaken (Fuller et al., 




automatically guarantee that better pasture management is practised.  Indeed, no 
hard evidence is provided in the literature of the improved pasture management 
and livestock husbandry practices which have reportedly been adopted (Fuller, 
op cit.), nor of the impact that these have had on the actual productivity of the 
livestock enterprises.  Similarly, although Cox et al (1998:93) note that following 
fencing, some of the farms were stocked with high-performing livestock breeds - 
Afrikaner, Simmentaler and Brahman - in order to ensure production of good 
quality beef, no details are provided of the resulting increased volume and 
quality of marketed output.  Likewise, a number of ‘enclosers’ are making 
regular use of animal health and production inputs (veterinary drugs, vitamin 
supplements and licks, for example), but no evidence exists on the impact that 
their use has had on enterprise productivity. 
 
One feature agreed upon by all observers is the limited use made of labour on 
the fenced farms once they have been established – rarely more than five 
labourers are employed on a full-time basis.  Furthermore, particularly since 
Independence, large numbers of Angolan nationals have become available to 
work as labourers.  They tend to comprise the bulk of the pool from which the 
farmers obtain their workforce and, because of their availability, tend to be a 
low-cost source of labour (Fuller et al., 1996:9).  
 
5.2  On the unfenced areas 
 
The land currently being fenced is ideal for extensive livestock raising.  Over 
many years, a highly-effective pastoral system based on the seasonal use, resting 
and rotation of grazing areas has been developed - as far as possible adjusting 
the number of animals to annual rainfall and forage production (referred to as 
“tracking” by some writers).  Herders have done this through the seasonal 
movement – transhumance - of animals in an opportunistic manner, which is 
essential in the semi-arid and variable environment of Namibia.  The fencing of 
some areas of rangeland has disrupted these migration patterns – cutting herders 
and their animals off from their traditional seasonal watering points and grazing 
land, thus reducing the area of the range over which the livestock are able to be 
herded.  The flexibility of the age-old pastoral strategy, which is essential given 
the variability of rainfall in these areas, has been reduced (Quan et al., 1994: 6).  
This, therefore, has resulted in under-utilisation of the grazing resource. 




5.2.1  Social and economic differentiation 
 
As has been shown earlier, most enclosure is being undertaken by individuals 
who are rich and politically powerful, while the poor and powerless remaining 
on the communal-tenure land are becoming marginalised as they are excluded 
from the resources – both grazing and water - that the fences enclose (Werner et 
al., 1990:102).  Tapscott (1990:12) provides anecdotal evidence to show that there 
is growing differentiation between cattle owners and non-owners.  Furthermore, 
those households with only limited numbers of animals (and research shows that 
these tend to be the poorer households operating on the open ranges) have 
tended to suffer disproportionately from the effects of drought – often losing 
their entire herds/flocks during these disasters (FAO, 1994:30).  Richer farmers 
on the other hand have usually survived such droughts with a viable herd - their 
wealth – still intact.  
 
Whilst, early on, it may have been the case that, “…. the villagers are accepting 
these enclosures” (MASDAR Zambia Ltd, 1993:15), with the same number (or, 
possibly, more) livestock competing for a reduced area of pasture, it was not long 
before tension between ‘enclosers’ and non-encloser communities increased, with 
reports appearing in the press of owners of livestock which strayed into the 
fenced areas being punished or, worse, having their cattle confiscated by the 
‘encloser’ in question (The Namibian; 05/05/94).  In their study conducted in the 
mid-1990s, Fuller & Turner (1995:22) refer to the “explosive nature” of the 
fencing issue.  Even the White Paper on Land Policy (MLR&R, 1997: 4) recognises 
that simmering resentment between those who are excluded from sections of 
communal-tenure rangeland and those who feel that the land is rightfully theirs, 
is now common: “…. in several parts of the country there is growing tension 
between those who are thereby excluded from access to this land”23.  Cox et al. 
(1998:107) also note that, at the present time, conflicts are becoming increasingly 
common and that there continue to be reports in the press of violence associated 
with land disputes.  
 
5.2.2 Drought  susceptibility 
 
The areas which are now being fenced in the east of Oshikoto and Ohangwena 
regions, were, in the past, used as emergency grazing areas.  For this reason, in 
times of drought in future years the livestock herds of the ‘non-enclosers’ will 
have no feed resources on which to fall back.  These herders are also blocked by 




grazing) to which they have traditionally had access for dry-season grazing, 
beyond the current enclosed areas – in western Kavango region24 for example – 
even after these areas have experienced good rains.  The result of the fencing is, 
therefore, to limit the options for these herders who tend to be the poorest 
producers and to increase, significantly, the vulnerability of their herds to the 
mortality and morbidity arising from variations in environmental conditions - 
drought, in particular (Dewdney, 1996:17).  As a result, their livelihoods and 
those of the members of their households, are being directly threatened.  
 
5.2.3 Environmental  considerations 
 
With fencing, seasonal transhumance routes have been disrupted.  The ‘non-
enclosers’ have thus been forced to graze their animals on ever-smaller areas and 
to keep them grazing longer on a given area of rangeland – in particular, in the 
areas adjacent to water points (compounded in recent years by the virtual 
absence of land-use planning inputs in planning the siting of new boreholes).  
Not surprisingly, therefore, inordinate pressure is being placed by the livestock 
on the ecology of the pasture of the non-enclosed lands, in general, and on the 
“sacrifice zones”25 around still-accessible water points and settlements, in 
particular.  This, in turn, means that far-reaching, permanent damage is being 
done to the vegetation – certainly, in these latter areas - leading inexorably to 
desertification (Seely et al., 1994:16).   
 
Furthermore, residual ‘corridors’ have been created between the fenced 
properties, along which the livestock of the ‘non-enclosers’ must pass; rarely is 
there access to water along their length and they tend rapidly to become heavily 
overgrazed narrow strips of land.   
 
Thus, poor range management practices have been forced on the farmers making 
use of the unfenced communal-tenure pastures (Ashley, 1994: 9).  The overall 
effect, then, of the enclosures has been the creation of a shortage of grazing 
where virtually none existed before while, at the same time, some remote 
pastures are now under-utilised as access to them is no longer possible.  
 
5.2.4  Marketing and herd productivity 
 
The existence of the fenced areas means that significant deviations now need to 




(Fuller  et al., 1996:8).  This clearly acts as a deterrent to these producers to 
maintain – let alone increase – their rates of offtake. 
 
The overall impact of fencing on the productivity of the ‘non-enclosed’ herds has 
not been studied in any objective way.  However, it is possible to hypothesise 
that productivity is likely to have been adversely affected – the livestock have to 
be trekked further to reach the remaining un-enclosed boreholes and rangeland 
causing the output of meat, draught power and milk to be less than would have 
been the case under the traditional grazing systems.  
 
5.2.5 Crop  production 
 
One researcher has pointed out that the fencing of large tracts of land has serious 
implications for the sustainability of pearl millet output, given the 
complementary nature of crop and livestock production in the farming systems 
found throughout the Northern Communal Areas (NCAs).  The ‘enclosers’ 
crowd out the existing small herders and make it difficult for potential new 
herders to enter the ‘ownership arena’.  By farming without cattle and, 
consequently, without the manure they provide, “…. poor farmers are forced to 
mine the soil that accelerates degradation accompanied by declining grain yields 
and yield stability” (Matanyaire, 1998: 164). 
 
5.2.6  On the welfare, in general, of the local population 
 
Research in similar agro-ecological environments elsewhere has shown that 
enclosure leads to a reduction in overall agricultural output from the now-
privatised land but that this reduced output is shared between fewer people.  For 
this reason, the smaller number of beneficiaries tend to be better off than the 
average farmer in the communal-tenure areas.  Parallel with this is the reduced 
output from the non-enclosed areas, as described above.  Taken together, it can 
therefore be concluded that fencing is having a negative impact on output from 
the rangelands and that the welfare of the ‘non-enclosers’ and their families is 
suffering as a result, since agriculture provides an essential component of the 
livelihoods of most of the poorest households in the area under review.  In 
addition, it can be hypothesised that the enclosure movement is leading to a 
reduction in the number of people able to earn a living from agricultural 
production in the rangeland areas.  The farm households which find themselves 
surplus to requirements in the area will therefore have to seek employment in 




rate of rural-urban migration in the country (Division of Agricultural Planning, 
1997:4-5). 
 
In summary, the enclosure of the rangelands would appear to be working 
directly against national development policy which emphasises, among other 
things, the goals of employment creation, poverty eradication and improved 
household food security (National Planning Commission, n.d: 39 & 169).  Indeed, 
it is also contrary to national policy on land which, “will at all times seek to 
secure and promote the interests of the poor…” (MLRR, 1997:6). The 
combination of private land enclosures and the “privatisation” of water sources 
is perhaps the most salient land use issue to be considered in analysing the rural 
poverty situation and in drawing up measures to combat it. 
 
Finally, as touched on earlier, the current situation is acting as an impediment to 
the broader land reform process, since there is no incentive for any potential 
investor in land to consider purchasing land in the private-tenure farming areas.  
In spite of the payments which need to be made to the traditional authorities in 
order to obtain land in the communal-tenure areas, the cost of this is likely to be 
only a fraction of the cost of a similar-sized area to the south of the VCF.  Until 
something is done to alter this situation – for example, by levying a tax on farm 
land - entrepreneurs wishing to get involved in cattle production will continue 
(from the cost point-of-view alone) to seek land in the communal-tenure areas.  
The result will be for the negative impact on productivity, output and welfare for 
the majority, as outlined above, to continue unabated. 
 
6.  POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
 
6.1  Inventory and monitoring 
 
From the evidence presented earlier, there can no longer be any doubt that the 
enclosure movement is highly significant - from the spatial, social, economic and 
political points of view (Pankhurst, 1995:568); certain individuals have now 
obtained exclusive rights to and influence over, significant areas of grazing land.  
It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that virtually no efforts have been made by 
the government to carry out an inventory of the extent of the fences nor to 
monitor the evolution of the ‘privatisation’  p r o c e s s .   I f  a  s u r v e y  w e r e  t o  b e  
carried out, it would then be possible for both the fences and the remaining 
communal-tenure rangeland areas to be registered, and the rights pertaining to 





Equally urgent is the need for a comprehensive inventory of water installations 
in the area.  The information collected and analysed during this exercise would 
serve both to provide an objective basis for planning any new boreholes in 
particular areas and to control abuse of the existing boreholes.   
 
For these and other reasons, it would be important for both these inventories to 
be publicised widely.  The information gained through this work would also 
facilitate future land-use planning in these areas – including the rationalisation, 




There is an urgent need for detailed, applied studies to be carried out on a 
number of different aspects of the fencing issue in order to inform and shape 
national policy on communal land tenure, as well as on associated water 
development activities.  For example, a p r o g r a m m e  o f  r e s e a r c h  i s  n e e d e d  t o  
assess the extent and nature of the fencing phenomenon in order to decide how 
affected communities might best approach the problem of reduced mobility 
(Dewdney, 1997:32).  Other studies should be undertaken to establish to what 
extent overall agricultural output has been and is being affected by fencing (and, 
by association, whether the resulting farming system is able to support more 
people).  Such a study should review the productivity per unit of land, capital 
and labour employed as well as the net financial returns realised from, livestock 
farming systems on fenced and non-fenced areas and, within the ‘fenced areas’ 
category, between newly-enclosed properties on communal-tenure land and 
established farms in the nearby private-tenure areas. 
 
To complement this research, a sociological survey should be undertaken 
investigating the private- and communal-tenure forms of rangeland and water 
management and control which exist in the geographical areas under 
consideration here.  The results of such a survey could be used to facilitate the 
work of the government ministries and Land Boards, which are to be 
responsible26 for managing the land tenure reform process in communal-tenure 
areas and for resolving any differences which exist between communal-tenure 
farmers and ‘enclosers’. 
 
Only with the data provided by this research will planners be able to assess the 




analyses of the data, will policy makers be in a position to make objective and 
informed decisions on the future strategy to be adopted in respect of these 
critical issues. Cox et al (1998: 5) underline the need for studies to obtain 
“objective, reliable and up to date information on current trends in resource 
ownership, access and allocation procedures”, in general in the communal-
tenure areas27 and in the regions affected by fencing, in particular.   
6.3  Land tenure resolution 
 
It is important that the new communal-tenure land legislation clarifies the legal 
ambiguities and resolves the outstanding questions which have continued to 
surround the whole question of enclosures to the present day.  The existing 
vacuum has created the latitude necessary for large-scale and rapid private 
enclosure of communal-tenure land to take place.  From what has been said 
earlier, however, the land legislation appears not to provide a legal framework 
for the development of community oversight and control of resources, nor for 
collective land ownership and effective mechanisms of common property 
resource management by local communities.  In the absence of such a framework 
the current chaos in the resource management situation will continue, with 
responsibility for decision making at the local level remaining unclear. 
 
This serious shortcoming must be addressed by the members of the National 
Assembly who will shortly begin debating the Communal Land Bill. 
(Nevertheless, the Land Boards which the Bill proposes should be established, do 
have the potential to resolve conflicts between ‘encloser’ and ‘non-encloser’ 
farmers).  It is important, for example, that the Land Boards ensure that detailed 
consultations are held at the local level, involving the affected communities as 
well as chiefs/traditional leaders, when an application is lodged to retain any 
existing fences.  Such consultations, which should also be a requirement when 
any community/local land management issue arises, will ensure that there is 
maximum local input into decisions about any future fencing.  Apart from 
anything else, this should result in more co-ordinated planning – from the 
ecological and equity angles – of land enclosures, as well as more efficient and 
effective use of the land. 
 
Finally, on this topic, if the fenced areas are formally surveyed and registered, 
the new owners (lessees) will be required to make annual rental payments based 
on the size of their holdings28.  The Bill currently states that these payments will 
be made to the State Revenue Fund.  However, it would seem more appropriate 




by the community itself; perhaps the most obvious would be for these funds to 
be used as the local contribution in respect of the various interventions detailed 






Steps should immediately be taken to assist groups of herders whose animals 
have only limited access to water in the distant (unfenced and under-used) 
rangelands over which they have rights to graze, to develop small-scale water 
points.  Such action is likely to impede the privatisation of the water points in 
these more-remote areas and, by implication, the surrounding rangeland areas, 
since communities would have been involved in constructing them and could, 
therefore, rightfully claim ownership of them (Cox et al., 1998:95).  Other 
suggestions for assistance to those herds/flocks (and farmers) grazing the 
communal-tenure rangeland that remains, include: intensified efforts by the 
public veterinary service to raise animal health status and to assist in making 
veterinary inputs more widely available; improvement of the livestock 
marketing system through such interventions as rural feeder road and auction 
pen construction; and, training herders in improved techniques of livestock 
husbandry.  All such interventions should be focussed, at least initially, on the 
more remote parts of the NCAs - Oshikoto and Ohangwena regions in particular.  
 
Given the poverty-reduction focus of such interventions, Namibia’s aid partners 
and NGOs are likely to be keen to support them.  It is therefore important that 
these agencies are requested to provide both technical and financial assistance in 
these fields as soon as possible.  They could also be approached to provide the 
training necessary to strengthen and thus increase the effectiveness of, the local-
level institutions involved with organising and managing common property 
resources.  Finally, these agencies should be requested to assist in building the 
capacity of the community organisations representing the poor in these areas, to 
enable them better to articulate the needs of their members and to remain 




The process of rangeland enclosure has been a relatively recent phenomenon, yet 




problem.  It has been shown that far from bringing relief to communal-tenure 
rangeland areas, the de facto privatisation process is creating a shortage of 
grazing land where none existed previously.  It is, thus, intensifying problems of 
access to community resources particularly by the poorer sections of the 
population in these areas and aggravating t h e i r  l i v e l i h o o d  s t a t u s .   I f  p o v e r t y  
reduction is, indeed, a national development goal, this group should be receiving 
support through policies which widen their access to these same resources. 
Worryingly, the outcome of the fencing phenomenon appears to be simply the 
substitution of the injustices inherited at Independence by new social and 
economic inequities. 
 
At the same time, however, it is important to be realistic as regards what action 
can now be taken.  The fences have been erected and it is highly unlikely that any 
of them will now be taken down since any attempt to have them removed would 
be virtually impossible to enforce.  Clear and comprehensive legislation backed 
up by prompt action finally to resolve the many issues which have arisen as a 
result of the enclosure movement, are urgently needed.  Only in this way will 
both the ‘fencers’ and those excluded from the rangelands be in a position to plan 
for an improvement in their social and economic well-being.  And, only in this 
way can we be assured that there will be no repetition of the enclosure 
movement in other so-far relatively unaffected parts of the country – western 




1.  Although a 1995/96 farm management survey carried out in Kavango region throws 
doubt on such a low figure.  It found that one-third of (imputed) agricultural income was 
derived from the crop sub-sector – even for households with large livestock holdings.  
Unfortunately, analysis of the survey data collected during the 1997/98 season in 
Ohangwena region has not yet been completed and time-series data are not available for 
any region.  
 
2.  However, one reviewer who has recently carried out PRA surveys in the area, argues that 
the proportion of farm households with no livestock is less than this.  She believes that the 
sample used in the survey from which the 40 per cent figure was derived, included peri-
urban households (El Obeid, S. pers. comm.). 
 
3.  “Under drought conditions such as those that occurred in 1991/92, small subsistence 
farmers who lack the means to fence land suffered higher stock losses than those who had 





4.  Tapscott (1994[a]) indicated that the first application to fence-off an area at Oshivelo was 
made and approved in 1978. 
 
5.  Leading one commentator to stress that, “…. fencing is less about grazing control than 
about controlling access to water” (Cox et al., 1998: 77) 
 
6.  The First National Development Corporation – the South African authorities’ parastatal 
“development” agency (although Cox et al. [1998: 37] state that it was the Bantu 
Investment Corporation [FNDC’s predecessor?] which established the Block). 
 
7.  Tapscott (1990: 21) stresses that fencing has taken off, “during the course of the past 18 
months, in particular”.  
 
8. Presumably  those  farming  in the Mangetti Block.  
 
9.  One extreme view is that this land-grab resembles that which took place in the United 
States during the Wild West days! 
 
10.  Presumably, the northern part of Kunene region in the north-west of the country – see 
Figure 1. 
 
11.  Fuller & Turner’s 1995 study shows that fencing was widespread around Okakarara in 
Omaheke region in the central-east part of the country, in addition to Ohangwena and 
Oshikoto regions.  
 
12.  The total fenced area also includes the land used for cropping and the associated small 
grazing enclosures. 
 
13.  Including those employed in mining.  
 
14.  For example, a 1,000-hectare block of land would require approximately 12.6 kilometres 
of fencing.  At current prices, this would cost at least N$ 50,000, in materials alone (Dr 
A. Norval, pers.comm.).  [The enclosures tend to be constructed with fence posts and 
wire – not the usual log or log and thorn-branch fences which are found around 
homesteads and arable plots in the communal-tenure areas (MASDAR Zambia Ltd., 
1993: 15)]. 
 
15.  This word is used advisedly; women ‘enclosers’ are never mentioned in the literature. 
 
16.  “…. the ‘prices’ for some parcels ran into the tens of thousands of dollars” (Fuller et al., 




17.  In reviewing an early draft of this paper, Blackie noted that these cost figures are already 
somewhat out of date (pers.comm.). 
 
18.  Cox et al. (1998) refer to the “fuzziness” of the land tenure situation. 
 
19.  Presumably, these are the same as the “adjudication commission plus tribunals” which 
were envisaged by Cabinet as being set up under the Act to, “deal with….problems” of 
“… illegal fencing in the communal-tenure areas” (Minister Hamutenya, quoted in The 
Windhoek Advertiser, 04/12/94).  
 
20.  However, a reviewer has stated that this 10-year clause has since been removed since it is 
discriminatory on ethnicity grounds (Blackie, R. pers. comm.) 
 
21.  This finding is echoed by Adams et al (1990: 111) for eastern Namibia, where they found 
evidence of severe over-stocking of fenced communal-tenure land in the Okamatapati 
area. 
 
22.  Contrasting strongly with the often-expressed view that there is little evidence of internal 
camping (paddocking), nor of water being made widely available, on the ‘privatised’ 
farms. 
 
23.  The final part of the sentence appears to have been omitted! 
 
24..  Although this avenue, increasingly used in recent years by livestock herders from 
Oshikoto and Ohangwena regions seeking new areas for their animals to replace the lost 
pastures, may not be available for much longer (Cox et al, 1998: 78).  Kwangali 
authorities in Kavango have recently expressed their concern about this increasingly-
common practice and the likelihood of it leading to friction in the near future unless 
restrictions are placed on it (Fuller et al, 1996:8). 
 
25.  Behnke, R. (pers. comm.) 
 
26.  According to the Communal Land Bill. 
 
27.  They also stress the need for this research to be carried out by Namibian researchers (ibid: 
96). 
 
28.  The precedent has already been set in the Mangetti Block, where leases on 97 fenced 
properties of 1,200 ha each, were granted some time ago and annual rental payments 
have been made since that date. 
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